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STRATEGIC AIMS OF AXIS VS. AMERICAN BROADCASTS

Report No. 27

March 30, 1942

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STRATEGIC AIMS OF AXIS VS. AMERICAN BROADCASTS

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SUMMARY

An objective comparative study is presented of the strategic aims implicit in the government-controlled broadcasts of Germany, Italy and Japan to the United States, and of America to Europe and Japan. The materials analyzed are sample scripts in the period from mid-January to the end of February.

The strategy of the Axis countries is almost unrelievedly and uniformly destructive; that is, to divide, weaken and immobilize the American audience and to destroy confidence in allied strength. A negligible amount of time is spent on converting the audience to Axis standards or to the belief in its strength.

The strategy of American propaganda to Europe is consistently the reverse -- that of converting the audience to the allied cause and to the belief in its potential strength -- though the propaganda to Japan follows the destructive pattern.

The psychological implications of these strategies are considered. The themes used to implement them, and separate types of programs resorted to are analyzed. The degree of constancy of these strategies over the period sampled is also examined.

STRATEGIC AIMS OF AXIS VS. AMERICAN BROADCASTS

I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to make an objective analysis of the strategic propaganda aims. Most propaganda analysis of this sort has in the past been subjective in nature; attempts to use an objective approach have been concerned mainly with techniques, content, or (as in the case of the weekly analyses supplied by the Federal Communication Commission) a combination of content and implied purposes or strategy. For all-round usefulness in various government agencies, the FCC approach is probably the best; but it is difficult to attain strict comparability between nations where content is emphasized.

The present study, which is more or less experimental in nature, was undertaken for two reasons:

(1) to provide insight into the motivation or strategic aims of enemy nations, as implied by the themes of their propaganda; and

(2) to obtain an accurate, detailed comparison of the radio propaganda of Axis countries with United States broadcasts.

The results obtained may be useful in assessing objectively the differences between the strategic aims implicit in the radio broadcasts of this country and of various enemy nations, while throwing some light on the strong and weak points of the propaganda strategy employed by each country. The study also provides some insight into the motives of enemy propagandists,

which may be of assistance in formulating counterpropaganda, for both domestic and foreign audiences.

II. METHODS

Programs Studied. In order to discover the more persistent strategic aim in the radio propaganda of each country, we have confined our study to government-sponsored programs, primarily those of a non-news or "feature" type (i.e., special programs and commentaries). The basic analysis was made of scripts from the following sources for the period February 15 to 28, 1942. (See Table 1, 3 and 4 for data on feature programs.)

(1) U. S. to Europe and U. S. to Japan - COI-FIS feature scripts.

(2) Germany, Italy and Japan to U. S. - Scripts (complete as monitored) of various official commentators, secured from the FCC Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service.

In addition to these feature scripts, a brief analysis was made of U. S.-German and comparable German-U. S. news scripts for the period February 21 to 27, 1942. (Table 2).

Comparisons as a key to strategic aims. By comparing the broadcasts of the various countries during the same period of time, world events thus being the same, we discern more easily differences in the design of their propaganda. By comparing the strategic aims of January with those of February, we can see the constancy of such aims. By emphasizing feature rather than news broadcasts, we deal with programs least apt to be influenced by day-to-day military developments, hence probably more directly attributable to planned strategy -- though strategy, of course, influences news

broadcasting also through the judicious selection and phrasing of items to be broadcst.

Strategic aims. A preliminary analysis revealed that the implied strategic aims readily fell into four major classes, which became the basis of our comparisons:

(1) To divide, or weaken, or immobilize the enemy;

(2) To convert the enemy audience to one's own point of view;

(3) To destroy confidence in the enemy's strength;

(4) To build faith in one's own strength.

Themes. A detailed study and classification of the content of the scripts revealed a variety of themes used to implement each of the strategic aims. These themes are shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 as subheadings under the major aims. The object of the analysis was to discover the amount of time devoted to each aim and theme. The measure of time was the nearest number of vertical inches of single-spaced typing (six lines to an inch) devoted to it; brief references of less than half an inch in the scripts were given a value of one.1/

1/ Reliability of judgment. One person did all of the coding, tabulating and analyzing. To check on his coding, he recoded a set of seven scripts after an interval of a week. Discrepancies were negligible. As a further check, another person coded the same scripts. The two analysts ascribed the same theme to 85 per cent of the units, the same aim to 94 per cent. This show a high reliability of individual rating of items; and the reliability of per cents based on many items is thus much higher, since some of the differences on specific items tend to cancel each other out.

III. ANALYSIS OF BASIC STRATEGIC AIMS OF AXIS AND U.S. BROADCASTS

A. German, Italian and U. S. Broadcsts Compared

What are the basic strategic aims of the propaganda of the warring nations, as deduced from their broadcasts? Table I summarizes the implied aims and themes of the German and Italian feature broadcasts in English to North America, and sets alongside of them a similar analysis of American broadcasts to Europe during the same period (the latter half of February, 1942).

TABLE I. IMPLIED AIMS AND THEMES OF GERMAN AND ITALIAN NON-NEWS BROADCASTS IN ENGLISH TO NORTH AMERICA AND OF AMERICAN NON-NEWS SCRIPTS WRITTEN FOR BROADCAST TO GERMANY, ITALY AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, FEBRUARY 15-28, 1942

Implied Aims and Themes of Radio Broadcasts:	Germany to N. America	Italy to N. America	U. S. to Europe
Total Units	847	554	572
	Per cent Distribution		
Total	100	100	100
1. To divide, weaken, and immobilize, enemy:	63	63	6
a. Group vs. group in enemy nation	5	8	0
b. Enemy nation vs. its allies	9	6	0
c. Enemy people vs. leader	18	11	2
d. Inaccuracy of enemy information	20	3	2
e. Attacks on enemy culture, conditions	3	20	2
f. Satire on enemy country in general	6	9	0
g. Attacks on enemy war, morality, ethics	2	5	0
h. Emphasis on hardships of war	0	1	0
i. Stress on bad effects if enemy wins	*	*	*
j. Appeals for revolt or capitulation	0	*	0
2. To convert audience to own point of view:	5	5	13
a. Favorable references to own leaders	*	1	3
b. Praise for accuracy of own information	1	*	0
c. Praise for own culture, conditions	3	3	9
d. Praise for war, morality, ehtics	1	*	1
e. Good results if own side wins	0	1	*
3. To destroy confidence in enemy strength:	15	18	11
a. Military weakness, losses of enemy	13	9	1
b. Enemy economic weakness	*	1	1
c. Enemy morale weakness	1	1	0
d. Disunity among allies of enemy	1	6	3
e. Antagonism of nonbelligerents	*	1	6
4. To build confidence in own allied strength:	12	7	67
a. Military strength, victories	11	3	35
b. Economic strength, resources	*	4	17
c. Morale strength, inner unity	0	0	11
d. Unity with, and of, allies	1	0	3
e. Friendly relations with nonbelligerents	0	0	1
5. Miscellaneous:	5	7	3
a. Introductory or "build-up" items	1	1	*
b. Rapport-building items	3	4	*
c. Neutral or expository items	1	2	3
Total negative material (1 & 3)	78	81	17
Total positive material (2 & 4)	17	12	80
Total neutral material (5)	5	7	3

* Less than .5 per cent.

The outstanding difference between Axis and the United States commentaries was that Germany and Italy were negative in their approach, employing chiefly attacks and accusations, while out broadcasts were much more positive (pro-Allies rather than anti-Axis) in tone. Almost two-thirds of German and Italian time was spent on "wedge-driving" types of propaganda -- attempts to divide and weaken America internally, to split us away from our allies, and to immobilize us by causing us to doubt our leaders, our sources of information, the validity of our war aims, and even the good qualities of our culture and our social system. Most of the remaining time devoted to emphasizing Axis military strength and Allied military weakness has a similar aim -- to terrorize us by making us lose faith in our chances of ultimate victory.

American feature scripts written for transmission to Europe did not, on the other hand, rely mainly on attacks, accusations, and assertions of enemy weakness, but was largely devoted to building up faith in our own strength and in attempting to convert the audience to our viewpoint. Two-thirds of our time was spent in emphasizing our strength, over a third being devoted to our military program.

B. German and U. S. News Broadcasts Compared

There was somewhat less difference between the implied aims of German news broadcasts in English to North America and American news broadcasts from London in German to Germany (Table 2). In both cases, about a sixth of all radio time was spent in divisive or "wedge-driving" propaganda. Over half of

Germany's efforts in this category consisted of attacks on United Nations' leaders, however, while our items of this general type primarily exposed false propaganda by the enemy. Similarly, both countries devoted almost half of all items to emphasizing thier own strength; but Germany placed much more stress on her military strength and victories than we did, while we placed much greater strength on our internal morale and unity with our allies. We attacked enemy military strength much less frequently, and used reasonable arguments to convert the audience to our point of view much more frequently than did the Germans in their news broadcasts.1/

C. Japanese and U. S. Feature Broadcasts Compared

Analysis of the Japanese commentaries shows almost as high a proportion of negative items or attacks on the United Nations as does that of the European Axis powers (Table3). The Japanese scripts emphasized British and American weakness much more, however, and "wedge-driving" propaganda much less, than did the European powers. In part this was no doubt an expedient dictated by the fact that Japan was winning battles in this period, and in part it was a reflection of the exuberance expressed on the Japanese home radio over the quick victories gained at the expense of the United Nations. In addition, the Japanese are in

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1/ No scripts of British broadcasts to Germany were available for analysis. From the available evidence, it seems evident that, for this same period, the divisive strategy was extensively used in British broadcasts to the enemy and occupied countries of Europe.

TABLE 2. IMPLIED AIMS AND THEMES OF ONE GERMAN NEWS BROADCAST DAILY IN ENGLISH TO NORTH AMERICAN AND OF THE AMERICAN DAILY NEWS BROADCAST FROM LONDON IN GERMANY TO GERMANY, FEBRUARY 21-27, 1942

Implied Aims and Themes of Radio Broadcasts:	Germany to N. America	U. S. to Germany
Total Units	213	219
	Per cent Distribution	
Total	100	100
1. To divide, weaken, and immobilize, enemy:	16	17
a. Group vs. group in enemy nation	0	1
b. Enemy nation vs. its allies	0	2
c. Enemy people vs. leaders	9	4
d. Inaccuracy of enemy information	2	6
e. Attacks on enemy culture, conditions	0	1
f. Satire on enemy country in general	0	*
g. Attacks on enemy war, morality, ethics	5	*
h. Emphasis on hardships of war	0	2
i. Stress on bad effects if enemy wins	0	*
j. Appeals for revolt or capitulation	0	0
2. To convert audience to own point of view:	2	12
a. Favorable references to own leaders	*	2
b. Praise for accuracy of own information	0	7
c. Praise for own culture, conditions	*	1
d. Praise for war, morality, ethics	1	1
e. Good results if own side wins	0	1
3. To destroy confidence in enemy strength:	32	18
a. Military weakness, losses of enemy	25	11
b. Enemy economic weakness	4	0
c. Enemy morale weakness	*	*
d. Disunity among allies of enemy	2	1
e. Antagonism of nonbelligerents	*	6
4. To build confidence in own, allied strength:	49	45
a. Military strength, victories	31	19
b. Economic strength, resources	7	6
c. Morale strength, inner unity	*	10
d. Unity with, and of, allies	4	9
e. Friendly relations with nonbelligerents	7	1
5. Miscellaneous:	1	8
a. Introductory or "build-up" item	*	5
b. Rapport-building items	0	2
c. Neutral or expository items	*	1
Total negative material (1 & 3)	48	35
Total positive material (2 & 4)	51	57
Total neutral material (5)	1	8

* Less than .5 per cent

TABLE 3. IMPLIED AIMS AND THEMES OF JAPANESE NON-NEWS BROADCASTS IN ENGLISH TO NORTH AMERICA AND OF AMERICAN NON-NEWS BROADCASTS TO JAPAN, FEBRUARY 15-28, 1942

Implied Aims and Themes of Radio Broadcasts:	Japan to N. America	U. S. to Japan
Total Units	312	336
	Per Cent Distribution	
Total	100	100
1. To divide, weaken, and immobilize, enemy:	41	74
a. Group vs. group in enemy nation	4	2
b. Enemy nation vs. its allies	5	37
c. Enemy people vs. leaders	12	11
d. Inaccuracy of enemy information	10	8
e. Attacks on enemy culture, conditons	3	6
f. Satire on enemy country in general	0	0
g. Attacks on enemy war, morality, ethics	6	4
h. Emphasis on hardships of war	1	3
i. Stress on bad effects if enemy wins	0	0
j. Appeals for revolt or capitulation	*	3
2. To convert audience to own point of view:	8	4
a. Favorable references to own leaders	0	*
b. Praise for accuracy of own information	2	1
c. Praise for own culture, conditons	*	2
d. Praise for war, morality, ethics	2	*
e. Good results if own side wins	4	*
3. To destroy confidence in enemy strength:	31	9
a. Military weakness, losses of enemy	16	7
b. Enemy economic weakness	6	1
c. Enemy morale weakness	2	*
d. Disunity among allies of enemy	5	1
e. Antagonism of nonbelligerents	2	*
4. To build confidence in own, allied strength:	15	8
a. Military strength, victories	9	5
b. Economic strength, resources	3	*
c. Morale strength, inner unity	1	1
d. Unity with, and of, allies	*	2
e. Friendly relations with nonbelligerents	2	*
5. Miscellaneous:	5	5
a. Introductory or "build-up" items	4	4
b. Rapport-building items	1	*
c. Neutral or expository items	*	1
Total negative material (1 & 3)	72	83
Total positive material (2 & 4)	23	12
Total neutral material (5)	5	5

* Less than .5 per cent

a much poorer position than Germany and Italy for starting divisive rumors in this country, since they have relatively few listeners or sympathizers here. Probably for these reasons Japan attempted primarily to terrorize and immobilize her American audience.

In the last week in February, however, there was a marked shift toward more stress on divisive propaganda, and less emphasis on Japanese military strength, as compared with the preceding week. This shift, to be discusssed more fully below, may be attributed to two possible influences: (1) The fall of Singapore took place at the beginning of the first week of the period studied, and the Japanese naturally gave this maximum emphasis in that week. (2) Collaboration between Japan and the European Axis powers is increasing in the propaganda field, apparently, and this may have resulted in a rise in Japan's use of the "divide and weaken" tactics which have always characterized Berlin radio.

American feature broadcasts to Japan, unlike those to Europe, placed prime stress on the "wedge-driving" strategy. Almost three-fourths of our time was spent on material calculated to divide the Japanese people among themselves and split them away from Nazi Germany. Over a third of all material was aimed at driving wedges between the Japanese and their German allies alone. One reason for this may have been that the "Japan Against Japan" scripts were directed more exclusively to an enemy audience than were the European scripts; most of the latter, with the exception of the news broadcasts to Germany, were broadcast in seven European languages, to neutrals as well as belligerents. Furthermore, the speed with which Japan was moving toward India, where contact might

conceivably be made with the Nazis, made it possible and desirable to use this sort of strategy. In any case, the propaganda policy pursued in our Japanese broadcasts indicated that it was possible to put the Axis' own propaganda strategy to use against them without doing violence to our own standards of accuracy, ethics, or dignity.

D. Comparison of the Three Axis Nations

The German and Italian feature broadcasts were almost parallel in their major strategic aims. Both countries devoted 63 per cent of their time to divisive propaganda, and only 5 per cent to propaganda aimed directly at converting the audience to the fascist point of view. The generally aggressive strategy employed by the Japanese was essentially similar, although their greater military success in the period surveyed caused greater emphasis to be placed on Allied weakness than was true of German and Italian broadcasts, as noted above.

There were, however, certain differences which seem significant among the Axis powers' broadcasts, and particularly between those of Germany and Italy. For example, Germany spent 20 per cent of her time in attacking the United Nations' sources of information and only 3 per cent in attacking our culture and way of life, while in the Italian scripts these proportions were exactly reversed. Perhaps this indicated some sort of division of labor. Berlin radio devoted more time to attacks on Allied leaders than did Rome radio. The Italian radio, presumably because of Italy's lack of recent military successes, spent far less time on Axis military strength than did the German radio.

The German and Italian radios devoted about as much time to Japanese victories in the Far East as to Axis military successes and Allied weaknesses in Europe and on the Atlantic Ocean. In the two weeks of Japanese commentaries to North America, however, there was only one direct reference to a German military success, as such. Apparently the European Axis powers felt it necessary to play up Japan's victories in the absence of any conspicuous gains of their own. Japan, on the other hand, had plenty to talk about in her own geopolitical sphere, and apparently tended to consider the war in the Pacific as a more or less separate affair from the European conflict. Japan also played up the economic weaknesses of Great Britain and the United States to a greater extent than did Germany and Italy, as a result of her victories in Malaya and the Netherlands Indies. Finally, Japan placed much more stress upon the benefits of a Japanese victory to the peoples concerned than did Germany or Italy with regard to the effects of the war in Europe. Germany had no reference at all of this sort, and Italy's included only 1 per cent of all units, whereas Japan devoted 4 per cent of her North American commentaries and a much larger proportion of her broadcasts to Japan and Asia to "Asia for the Asiatics" propaganda.

E. Psychological interpretation

The broadcasting situation is one which the propagandist can control and by means of which he hopes to initiate desired action in the listeners. The detailed nature of action desired varies extensively, but there appear to be two main categories. On the one hand, the propagandist may aim to destroy enemy confidence by creating confusion, instilling doubts, arousing mistrusts, and in

other such ways weakening the united effort of the enemy population. On the other hand, the propagandist may attempt to convert the enemy audience to his point of view either by persuasion or by attempting to build confident belief that his power is overwhelming. Which of these two general aims is to be used should be determined, in large measure, by knowledge of the enemy being addressed and by the requirements of a particular major strategic plan.

Preliminary to its actions in Western Europe, Germany addressed its potential enemies with a destructive propaganda line. History evidences how successfully doubt and confusion were created in the peoples of France, the Low Countries, Norway and the Balkans. The value of this confusion existed only because Germany was in a position to take advantage of it by direct military action. While a similar tack was taken toward England, its success was negligible, especially after Germany's failure to invade the islands. For reasons which are a little hard to understand, Germany is apparently still holding to the destructive program in her broadcasts to North America. It is difficult to believe that she expects to produce results similar to those she had in continental Europe. Therefore, there must be other motives behind her broadcasts, which the foregoing analysis demonstrates to be heavily loaded with divisive or confusion themes.

Germany is aware that America with its vast area and heterogeneous population has real regional and class differences. It is quite possible, theoretically at least, that a program of destructive propaganda might capitalize on these differences, and create sufficient dissension and conflict to interfere seriously

with the American military and industrial war effort. Moreover, the Germans probably recognize that there are considerable numbers of people in this country who are not wholeheartedly in support of England, Russia, or China, and that these attitudes might be capitalized on, in order to weaken the solidarity of the United Nations. What the Germans apparently have not learned from their experience with England is that some nations may show a unity in the face of adversity rather than a national disintegration.

The Japanese in broadcasting to North America are apparently following the German reasoning and devoting almost as large a proportion of their time to destructive material as are the Germans. However, it is interesting to note that the Japanese are devoting a much larger proportion of their total time than are the Germans to the positive aim of conversion.

The propaganda from the United States to Europe and to Japan is in decided contrast. Toward Europe 80 per cent reveals the positive, converting aim while toward Japan a similar amount has the destructive, confusing, aim. This differential is reasonably accounted for by the differences in audiences. American broadcasts to Europe are not prepared specifically for Germany or any other single nation, but are translated and broadcast to the several peoples of Europe. The peoples of occupied Europe are already confused, doubtful and extremely disturbed. To use a negative line with them could have no useful effect. What they need and what has some a priori promise of success is encouragement, confidence, hope -- in short, to build in them attitudes that the power of the United States offers the solution to their doubts

and uncertainty.

It would appear of greater strategic importance to attempt to control the behavior of the peoples of these occupied countries than to be too exclusively concerned with the citizens of the German Reich. Propaganda aimed at the latter group could profitably utilize destructive aim designed to create in the minds of Germans doubt of their leaders, their ultimate success, and of the desirability of continuing their war activities; but the programs analyzed were not so specifically directed.

In broadcasts to Japan, on the other hand, the United States is addressing an enemy people. Furthermore, it is an enemy whose allies hold racial theories which are violated by the alliance itself. Thus the alliance is vulnerable on this ground. Nearly half of the specific items making up the destructive portion of American broadcasts are devoted to attacks on the Germans. There is some reason to believe that this destructive, confusing attack on Japan may eventually produce attitudes and behaviors in the Japanese which would be favorable to our efforts.

IV. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC PROPAGANDA THEMES

What sort of materials are used to give substance to the strategic framework revealed above? In order to answer this question, a brief discussion of the detailed themes by which the basic aims are implemented in the broadcasts of each country is here presented. (See Tables 1, 2, and 3 for basic statistical data.)

A. Germany

Of primary importance in German feature broadcasts, as

noted above, was propaganda aimed at dividing and weakening the United Nations. The main type of appeal used by the Nazis in at attempting to set group against group was anti-Semitism, with occasional references to the "plutocrats" who are alleged to be profiting by American participation in the war. Propaganda intended to split us away from the United Nations was aimed primarily at harnessing anti-Communist sentiment in this country and in England against Russia, and second at raising fear of being used by Britain to "pull her chestnuts out of the fire".

A little more than half of the attacks on Allied leaders were directed at this country, most of them at the President. The Nazis show an appreciation of the effectiveness of repeating slogans in their news broadcasts. At the end of every newscast they announce, "Franklin Delano Roosevelt promised peace but brought you war". Churchill bore the main brunt of attacks on British leaders until Cripps came into the Cabinet, after which the two men were about equally important as targets for Nazi invective. German counterpropaganda, aimed at exposing the falsity of Allied news claims, was directed at Great Britain in three-fourths of all references, at the United States in most of the remainder.

It is noteworthy that the Berlin radio made no references to the hardships and suffering of war, and practically no appeals for resistance of the people to the Allied leaders. Apparently these appeals were outside the pattern of Nazi propaganda, at least in the period covered. Perhaps such appeals are considered dangerous to the Nazi ideology, just as any reflection upon royalty anywhere is banned in Japan because it might detract from the

Emperor's prestige. Attacks on enemy war morality were made in several of the German news broadcasts. Satirical attacks on enemy leaders and culture appeared in a number of non-news dialogues and "skits" broadcast from Berlin.

Among the less frequent "conversion" references, it is interesting that although Berlin referred several times to the horrible effects of a United Nations victory, she made no direct promises of good results in Europe if the Axis won. Also, there was only one reference to the good qualities of German leadership. This was a remark by Lord Haw-Haw to the effect that Germany was led by a soldier, who had no need to defend himself against criticism; Hitler's name was not even mentioned. Apparently the Germans feel that Hitler and other top Nazi leaders are to us such symbols of the things we are fighting that is would be futile, or might even detract from the value of other parts of their broadcasts, to make direct appeals for support of Hitler. It should be remembered, however, that the period covered did not happen to coincide with any of Htiler's major speeeches, which are always used by the German commentators to enhance the Führer's prestige.

Most German attacks on Allied strength in the commentaries were concerned with military matters, and almost nine-tenths of these were directed against Great Britain. In the news broadcasts, however, more emphasis was placed on Russian than on British weakness. Similarly, three-fourths of the references to Axis military strength were in praise of the German army, one-fourth in praise of the Japanese, and one in praise of the Italians. In the German news broadcasts, favorable references to German and Japanese

military prowess were about equally divided, but the only reference to Italian or Finnish military strength was that implied by a reading of the military communiques of those countries. There were few references to economic or morale weaknesses in the United Nations, and none to corresponding strength in Germany or Italy. Practically no non-news material was directly concerned with Germany's good relations with non-belligerent or occupied countries; apparently the news broadcasts were relied upon to make this point more indirectly.

B. Italy

In their major themes, Rome radio's commentaries followed the Nazi pattern, with the differences noted in a previous section. In specific types of appeals used, however, there were interesting differences between Rome and Berlin commentaries. The Italian radio, paradoxically, had more anti-Semitic references than did Berlin; and in trying to drive wedges between the United Nations, more stress was placed on Anglo-American than on Russo-American differences. Attacks on United States leaders were more frequent than on British leaders, and the same tendency prevailed in attacks on Allied sources of information. Rome made a considerable number of attacks on our culture, both satirical and serious. Many of the latter type probably missed fire completely because of the commentator's obvious ignorance of the American scene. Examples of this were an attack on the "unhygienic" New York subway, and one on our federal political system which was alleged to result in shortages of food in Missouri, where "self-sufficiency" was not attained, while surpluses piled up in Illinois.

Rome radio made a number of references to Japanese economic strength, but none to Italian economic strength, morale, or good relations either with other Axis nations or non-belligerent countries.

C. Japan

In Japan's commentaries to North America, attempts to set one group against another within this country consisted largely of attacks on the "war mongers", although one or two anti-Semitic references crept in. Tokyo's attacks on the solidarity of the United Nations were directed almost entirely toward splitting the United States away from the British. President Roosevelt was the object of the great bulk of attacks on Allied leaders. Similarly, American rather than British sources of information drew all of Japan's fire. Atrocity charges against the Allies were numerous. Humor and satirical attacks on the United States were completely lacking.

Tokyo radio, like Berlin and Rome, made no attempt to build up her own national leaders in the eyes of the Americans. Frequent references were made, however, to Japan's good intention in taking the leadership in "Greater East Asia". Tokyo showed an overwhelming pride in her military victories, and paid no attention to the war in the West, as noted above.

D. The United States

Such attacks as we made on the Axis in our European non-news broadcasts were mainly against Nazi leaders. (Twice as frequent, however, were our favorable references to President Roosevelt and other American leaders.) In our news broadcasts to

Germany, we attacked Nazi sources of information several times; but in the same scripts, there were a greater number of references upholding our own news sources. In our broadcasts to Japan, there were attacks on Japanese-German relations, the "war-lords" in control of the Japanese government, and the official Japanese radio. It was noteworthy, however, that no direct attacks were made on the three top figures of the Axis states. The reasoning behind this was probably that the Mikado, and to a lesser degree Hitler and Mussolini, are fairly stable symbols of their respective nations in the minds of enemy audiences, whereas it is quite permissible within the democratic pattern of the United Nations for our top leaders to be criticized or even attacked. In fact, they are subject to replacement through the electoral process even in wartime.

In stressing our own strength, which was the predominant note in our broadcasts to Europe, our emphasis was first on our air power and productivity, second on our army and reserves of manpower, and third on our naval strength. Much space was devoted to the voluntary nature of our civilian war effort, our internal unity, and our unity with our Allies. In our news broadcasts, more time was devoted to the strength of our allies -- first of Britain, then of Russia, after our own case had been presented.

In our non-news broadcasts to Japan, unlike those to Europe, more stress was placed on Japanese and German military and economic vulnerability than on our own strength. This approach was quite consistent with the military situation in the Pacific, since it is probably futile to try to convince Japan of our military strength until we win one or more major victories, or

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force a Japanese withdrawal from some area now occupied. A number of direct and indirect appeals were made to the Japanese people to resist the demands of the "war lords" by demanding more rice and working for the cessation of hostilities. While these appeals can hardly be expected to be effective as long as Japan is winning one victory after another, it may be argued that they are laying the groundwork for a future intensification of this sort of propaganda. This might be productive of results if the war drags on and economic hardships are increased within Japan.

V. ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTIONS OF SELECTED PROGRAMS

How do the various featured commentators and programs fit into this general picture of propaganda strategy? To answer this question, separate tabulations were made of basic aims and themes implied in selected German, Italian and American feature programs.1/ Japanese commentaries were nearly all anonymous. (See Table 4.)

A. Germany

Berlin radio depends almost entirely on renegade Americans for its radio attacks on this country. "O.K.", a former German professor in a New York college, devotes practically all of his radio time to wedge-driving and the undermining of confidence in this country, none of it to pleas for support for the Nazis or statements of German strength. He also attacks President Roosevelt

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1/ Only a small number of scripts were available for any one feature program in the period surveyed, but an examination of these showed that they were fairly typical of prior and subsequent broadcasts in the same series.

and other American leaders more frequently than other commentators, 47 per cent of his material being devoted to this purpose, "Paul Revere" and Jane Anderson, whose main assets are their flamboyant styles and their patriotic and Catholic appeals, respectively, are relied upon for anti-Semitic propaganda. Jane Anderson specializes also in anti-Bolshevik divisive propaganda. Fred Kaltenbach, who sometimes refers informally to his friend Harry out in Iowa, does not attack the Jews, but specializes in "debunking" American news reports (in 29 per cent of all his material).

Lord Haw-Haw actually receives top billing on Berlin radio, since his talks are broadcast both to Great Britain and to the United States. He specialized in attacking British leaders, but not American leaders, in the period surveyed. He also attacked British sources of information and stressed British military weakness. Although he fills a special function in undermining the confidence of his American audience in the British, he is probably the least effective of the Nazi commentators to North America because of his lack of rapport with the people of this country.

The "Hot Shots from the Front" and miscellaneous military commentators are relied on by the Nazis to build up respect for, and fear of, German military strength. None of the other commentators except Lord Haw-Haw and Fred Kaltenbach devoted much time to this end.

B. Italy

No featured Rome commentators appeared frequently enough during the period surveyed to permit intensive analysis. It may be noted, however, that Ezra Pound specialized, in an incoherent way,

TABLE 4. IMPLIED AIMS OF SELECTED NON-NEWS PROGRAMS, BY COUNTRY, FEBRUARY 15-28, 1942.

Country and Program *	Percent of Units Classed as: Divisive References	Conversion References	Enemy Weakness	Own Strength	Miscellaneous
1. Germany					
Lord Haw-Haw (4)	61	2	26	9	2
Fred Kaltenbach (4)	67	3	15	10	5
Jane Anderson (4)	81	13	0	0	6
O. K. (4)	79	0	20	0	1
Paul Revere (2)	69	13	9	6	3
Hot Shots from the Front (3)	3	0	10	80	7
2. Italy					
Ezra Pound (2)	82	0	0	0	18
Col. Knox and Snow White (11)	100	0	0	0	0
3. United States					
United America Fights (13)	3	10	3	84	0
Europe Strikes Back (2)	23	0	77	0	0
This is America (2)	8	65	0	9	18
Made in America (2)	0	0	0	100	0
U. S. Official Opinion (2)	5	13	0	80	2

* Number of scripts upon which analysis was based is given in parentheses after each program.

in attacking everything American--particularly our leaders, our way of life, our cultural and economic conditions, and our racial heterogeneity. Also of interest is the anonymous serial fantasy about Colonel Knox, his white circus horse Basil, his white seal Snow White, Lulu Schnitzelbaum, and leading American figures from the President on down. This five-minute program appeared twice daily in English whenever scripts were available. It apparently had as one of its main purposes the attraction and retention of listeners to Rome radio. From the point of view of specific themes, however, the program was devoted about one-third to attacks on American leaders and two-thirds to satirizing and ridiculing the American scene in general.

C. The United States to Europe

The backbone of American programs written for Europe was the feature, "United America Fights", broadcast daily in French, German, Italian, Spanish, English, Swedish, Portuguese and Chinese. This program was devoted 84 percent to building confidence in our own strength--first military, then economic and finally morale, in that order. The remaining space in the scripts is taken up mainly in attempts to convert the audience to our way of thinking and living. The program is thus approximately 94 percent positive (pro-Allies rather than anti-Axis) in its appeal.

Of the weekly features broadcast to the continent, "Europe Strikes Back" is the one relied upon to report and stimulate opposition by the people of occupied nations against their German conquerors. It also stresses disunity among Axis members, and attempts to estrange the German people from their leaders.

"This is America" tells the story of our democratic way of life, while "Made in America" is devoted entirely to describing our military strength and economic productivity. "U.S. Official Opinion", like "United America Fights", is devoted primarily to describing our economic and military strength and unity with our allies (two-thirds of all references), but also to positive material on our leadership and war aims.

VI ANALYSIS OF TRENDS

1. To what extent do the propaganda motifs of the various nations remain constant in time? To check on this, comparisons were made between the results of a preliminary tabulation of German and American scripts from mid-January, 1942, and those obtained for the last half of February in the present study. In addition, the data for the latter month were broken down by weeks, to obtain the trend for a shorter period of time in all four countries.

The German pattern shifted from January to February, the amount of counterpropaganda (casting of reflections on United Nations news reports) rising from 4 to 20 percent of all broadcast time. This rise took place almost entirely at the expense of material on Germany's military and morale strength. Apparently a change in policy occurred at some time during this one-month period. This shift is underlined by the fact that from the third to the fourth week in February, German propaganda aims were distributed in an almost identical manner.

No important shift occurred in the Italian broadcasts

during February. In each week, 63 percent of all time was spent in making divisive appeals. References to Allied military weakness and disunity among the United Nations increased slightly, and references to Axis economic strength fell sharply. But this latter "trend" resulted entirely from the fact that a length description of Japanese resources in Southwest Asia happened to appear in the third, instead of the fourth, week in February.

The only important shifts in Japanese emphasis during the latter half of February were a decrease in references to Nipponese military strength (from 16 to 7 percent), and an increase in the number of attacks on American leaders and sources of information (from 6 to 16 percent and 3 to 13 percent, respectively). The latter change seemed to reflect a tendency toward more and more close imitation of the Nazi propaganda techniques; Japanese broadcasts followed the German pattern, but with a lag of about a month, in the period studied here.

American broadcasts, both to Europe and to Japan, showed numerous shifts in detailed emphasis; but in the broad aims implied, our scripts remained relatively stable in orientation. For example, although references to American strength in our European broadcasts dropped from 80 percent in January to 68 percent in February, they remained at the latter figure during both weeks of February. We employed divisive techniques in only 7 percent or less of all feature material to Europe during the periods studied in January or February.

In our broadcasts to Japan, divisive reference rose steadily, starting in January and extending through February, and

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references to allied military strength and enemy weakness declined from 25 to 10 percent. The latter change was a natural reflection of Japanese victories in the Pacific in mid-February; and since only one series of scripts -- thirteen in all -- were analyzed, the apparent shift toward the "divide and weaken" strategy may have been largely a chance variation caused by the inclusion of one or two additional commentaries of a divisive sort in the February period.

In our broadcasts both to Europe and to Japan, there was a sharp reduction from January to February in the number of references to our unity with other allied or neutral countries, mainly because the Rio conference took place in January and was much discussed in that period. Similarly, there was a drop in material on our morale and economic strength, which was compensated for by a sharp rise in the number of references to our military strength. This was particularly true of our European broadcasts, in which references to our military strength rose from 15 percent in mid-January to 35 percent in late February. This seemed to indicate a tendency toward a more aggressive type of appeal as the war goes on and our military productivity increases.